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Critics of export promotion policies have pointed out a fallacy of composition,
where what is viable for a small country acting in isolation might not be viable
when pursued by a group of countries simultaneously. This paper investigates the
crowding-out effect of the fallacy of composition; that is, whether developing
countries that specialize in exports of manufactured products compete and crowd
out one another’s exports. The results of fixed-effects panel estimation suggest
that developing countries are not crowding out one another’s exports. Instead,
they are crowding out Western European countries’ exports of manufactured
products.
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I. Introduction
Support for trade liberalization and export promotion policies is grounded in the
vision that productivity will rise through technological spillover and increased
specialization resulting from the division of labor. Crucial to this vision is the
assumption that there is growth of reciprocal demand between trading eco-
nomies, creating ever-expanding markets for all countries’ exports, so that no
country needs to fear a demand-side constraint on export growth. The majority
of the published empirical literature on trade liberalization indicates a positive
relationship between openness and output growth (e.g. Harrison, 1996). How-
ever, Rodriquez and Rodrik (2000) claim that there are weaknesses in the litera-
ture that support the virtues of openness, so they are skeptical of the negative
correlation between trade barriers and economic growth. Rodrik (1999, p. 64)
also notes that ‘the import substitution policies followed in much of the develop-
ing world until the 1980s were quite successful in some regards and their costs
have been vastly exaggerated’. Furthermore, during the period of the Washington
Consensus, the world and regional growth rates declined, except in China and
South Asian countries (Bosworth and Collins, 2003). The deterioration in
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regional growth has rendered trade liberalization and export promotion policies
open to challenge.
Critics of export promotion policies for developing countries point out the
fallacy of composition hypothesis, where what is viable for one small develop-
ing country acting in isolation might not be viable when pursued by a group of
developing countries simultaneously. The fallacy of composition hypothesis can
be divided into two effects: (i) the price level or terms-of-trade effect and (ii) the
crowding-out effect. The terms-of-trade effect takes place when increases in
exports by a group of developing countries result in the deterioration of export
prices, which could reduce economic welfare. To make matters worse, to make
up for the losses from lower prices, export volumes are increased, which moves
export prices lower along the supply curve. The crowding-out effect occurs
when the lack of demand from industrial countries forces developing countries
to displace one another’s export shares; that is, export growth for 1 country
comes at the expense of another. Therefore, export promotion policies only
shift the composition without raising overall growth. The lack of demand from
industrial countries might be caused either by protectionist policies induced by
high import penetration from developing countries (Cline, 1982) or by macro-
economic factors.
The present paper tests the crowding-out effect of the fallacy of composi-
tion hypothesis for a group of developing countries that specialize in exports
of manufactured products. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In
Section II, a short review of the fallacy of composition hypothesis is pro-
vided. Section III presents empirical evidence examining the possibility of
the crowding-out effect, and Section IV draws conclusions.
II. Terms-of-trade Deterioration and the Crowding-out Effect
Bhagwati (1958) is one of the first to demonstrate the possible negative effect of
export promotion policies for a country caused by an adverse terms-of-trade
effect.1 He shows that an increase in exports might result in an export-price
deterioration that could reduce economic welfare. The welfare impact is more
severe if the country relies on a small range of export products. This is particu-
larly important for developing countries that rely on exports of a small range of
primary commodities because they would be hard hit if other developing coun-
tries start to increase their exports of similar primary commodities. In fact, there
has been a consensus that developing countries’ primary commodities prices are
falling (e.g. Sapsford and Singer, 1998). Hence, it has often been advised
that developing countries should diversify into exports of manufactured goods.
However, developing countries’ terms of trade for manufactured products also
1. Before Bhagwati’s seminal contribution, several economists had been both concerned with and
curious about the then deterioration in the terms of trade of developing countries as a result of
decreasing terms of trade in primary products (e.g. Singer, 1950).
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show signs of weakness rather than improvement (Sarkar and Singer, 1991),
further complicating the matter. In examining the performance of the Dominican
Republic’s export processing zones, for example, Kaplinsky (1993, p. 1861)
shows that by specializing in unskilled labor-intensive products, the Dominican
Republic suffered from ‘immiserizing’ employment growth; that is ‘employment
growth which is contingent upon wages falling in international purchasing power’.
With an increasing number of developing countries specializing in unskilled
labor-intensive products, one of the most practical ways to compete is by keeping
prices low through paying low wages. The intense competition further reduces
developing countries’ terms of trade and, in this sense, unskilled labor-intensive
manufactured products are similar to primary commodities, which are experi-
encing a downwards trending terms of trade.2
On the crowding-out effect, Cline (1982, p. 89) illustrates that the East Asian
model of export-led growth cannot be generalized because it will result in
untenable market penetration, owing to protectionist responses from industrial
countries. He concludes:
Elevator salesman must attach a warning label that their product
is safe only if not overloaded by too many passengers at one
time: advocates of the East Asian model would do well to attach
a similar caveat to their prescription.
For the US market, Palley (2003) suggests that the newly industrialized eco-
nomies (NIE) of East Asia (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan)
are crowded out by imports from China, and Japan is crowded out by imports
from Mexico. He also argues that the entry of China into the world trading
system would make it more difficult for other developing countries to grow with
export-led growth policies.3 Furthermore, Bhattacharya et al. (2001) suggest that
the South Asian and Southeast Asian manufactured exports shares have been
negatively affected by the rise of China. They show that the emergence of China
reduced other Asian countries’ export shares for the period 1994–1996, but not
prior to 1994.
The proponents of export promotion policies argue that a fallacy of composi-
tion is not a cause for worry because of the development of new and unforeseen
markets. They assert that reciprocal demand will ease any capacity constraint
and that technological spillovers will help shifting developing countries’
comparative advantage. A shift in comparative advantage will change a country’s
2. See also Erturk (2001/2002). He argues that one of the causes of the East Asian crisis is the
investment boom in East Asia in the early 1990s. As they exited early their niche in labor-intensive
products, they created overcapacity to safeguard their position and, hence, reduced export prices for
East Asian manufactured products, which ultimately lead to the crisis.
3. We extend Palley (2003) to include other industrial countries, but Palley’s results do not hold
for other industrial countries. Instead, the share for all East Asian countries increases or stagnates in
other industrial countries.
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trade composition, therefore making room for new imports and exports from
developing countries on the lower steps of the technological ladder. This is the
essence of the ‘flying geese’ model (Akamatsu, 1962), where countries step onto
a higher rung of the technological ladder with the increase in their level of
economic development and relieve any adding-up constraint. Dowling and Cheang
(2000) and Cutler et al. (2003) provide evidence supporting the sequential
pattern of changes in comparative advantage for East Asian exports and show
that there is economic development trickle-down from Japan to the NIE and the
ASEAN-4.
III. Empirical Analysis
Developing countries investigated in the present study are those in which the
shares of manufactured exports in total merchandise exports are greater than
70 percent during 1990–2000 (19 countries). A relatively high share of manu-
factured exports is chosen because an export-led growth strategy implies that a
country relies on a high share of manufactured exports to stimulate its economy.4
Hence, if there is any crowding out, it will significantly affect the country’s total
exports and, consequently, its economic growth.
Bilateral trade data that are used to examine the crowding-out effect are from
the Center for International Data at the University of California, Davis.5 The
period covered is from 1991–2000. We concentrate on manufactured products
from Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) groups 6–8, disaggregated
at the two-digit level. Developing countries can be roughly divided into two
groups based on the composition of their exports. For the South Asian, Latin
American and African countries, exports are concentrated in products from SITC
groups 65, 84 and 89 (textiles, apparel and clothing, and miscellaneous manu-
factured products), while for the East Asian NIE, ASEAN, China, and Mexico
exports are concentrated in products from SITC groups 65, 84, 89 and 75–
77 (office and computer equipment, telecommunication equipment, electrical
machinery and appliances). Unlike developing countries, industrial countries’
compositions of exports are not concentrated in a few groups of products. The
average standard deviation for the export shares from SITC groups 6–8 is 9.8 for
the South Asian, Latin American and African countries, 5.8 for the East Asian
countries and 3.0 for industrial countries, indicating that the export shares for
industrial countries are more evenly distributed relative to developing countries.
The uneven distributions for developing countries mean that they are subjected
to greater risks of instability because of product cycles. Concentration of exports
4. The choice of 70 percent as a cut-off point is capricious. We assume that 70 percent of manufac-
tured export share is sufficiently large that it can affect overall exports and, consequently, economic
growth. Reducing it to 50 percent adds 5 more countries (South Africa, Brazil, Morocco, Indonesia
and Costa Rica) and this does not change the results.
5. The data can be downloaded from http://www.internationaldata.org/.
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within a few ranges of similar products also highlights the high degree of com-
petition for the export market share for developing countries.
To test for the crowding-out effect, the following standard specification of
fixed-effects panel regression is estimated for each of the countries’ ten most
important export groups from SITC groups 6–8:
∆Sk,i,t = αk + β1∆Sk, j,t + εk,t k = 1, 2, . . . , 10, (1)
where ∆Sk,i,t denotes the growth (percentage change)6 of product k’s world
export share for country i at time t, and ∆Sk,j,t  denotes the growth of product k’s
world export share for country j (the rival country) at time t. Coefficient β1
indicates whether an increase in a country’s world export share is statistically
associated with the decline or increase in the other country’s growth of world
export share. If there is a crowding-out effect, the coefficient β1 will be negative
and statistically significant. A positive coefficient means that country i’s growth
of export share is matched by its rival country. The top ten exports are used
because they account for a significant share of each country’s total exports. In
addition, because the export shares are concentrated in a few products, using all
26 groups will not improve the overall results. Instead, it only masks the import-
ance of the top exports.
An important note to this method is that because the arithmetic of shares is
constrained to sum to 1, the gain for 1 country is by definition the loss of
another. Therefore, the loss might be the product of arithmetic rather than quan-
tity crowding out. For example, if China enters the market for product X and
takes away the market share of another developing country, then the quantity
produced by the losing country might not fall because of an increase in the
demand for that product. However, at a disaggregated level the data on quantity
is lacking. Although this method cannot measure quantity crowding out, it meas-
ures market shares crowding out, and it can concretely indicate no crowding
out for developing countries. A positive or non-significant coefficient means
that developing countries are not crowding out one another, either in absolute
quantity or in market share.7 Hence, with positive or non-significant coefficients,
we can concretely conclude that crowding out is not a cause for concern for
developing countries with export-led growth strategies.
To test for crowding out, three sets of fixed-effects panel regressions are first
estimated from Equation (1). The first set consists of fixed-effects regressions of
individual developing country on individual developing country, the second set
6. The overall results do not change when using either ‘percentage change’ or ‘percentage point
difference’, but for a small number of cases the significance of the coefficient differs when using
different methods. The difference between the two methods is in the way they treat countries with
small and large market shares. Using percentage point difference, market share size does not matter,
but when using percentage change the market size matters.
7. Quantity exported by both countries might decrease because of lower demand, but it is not a
result of crowding out.
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Table 1 Summary of regression results for the first three sets of regressions
Crowding-out coefficient’s Number of cases
sign and significance and percentages
First set of regressions
Individual developing country Positive 68 (19.8%)
on individual developing country Negative 16 (4.7%)
Not significant 258 (75.5%)
Total 342
Second set of regressions
Individual developing country Positive 50 (13.2%)
on individual industrial country Negative 73 (19.2%)
Not significant 257 (67.6%)
Total 380
Third set of regressions
Individual industrial country Positive 115 (30.3%)
on individual industrial country Negative 74 (19.5%)
Not significant 191 (50.2%)
Total 380
Note: When the coefficient’s sign is indicated as positive or negative, it is statistically significant at
the 10% level.
is individual developing country on individual industrial country, and the third
set is individual industrial country on individual industrial country.
Next, two other sets of fixed-effects regression are estimated. The fourth set
contains a fixed-effects panel of developing countries as a group (all 19 coun-
tries) on individual industrial countries, and the fifth set is developing countries
as a group on individual developing countries.
Table 1 summarizes the results for the first three sets of regressions
(Appendix Tables A1–A3 report the complete results). In the first set of regres-
sions of individual developing country on individual developing country, out of
342 cases, 84 cases (24.6 percent) are statistically significant at the 10-percent
level and only in 16 cases are the coefficients negative. In the second set of
regressions of individual developing country on individual industrial country,
out of 380 cases, 123 cases (32.4 percent) are statistically significant (again at
the 10-percent level) and in 73 cases the coefficients are negative. In the third set
of regressions on the relationship between industrial countries, out of 380 cases,
189 cases (49.7 percent) are statistically significant, and 74 of the cases are
negative.
The numbers of statistically significant crowding-out coefficients are rela-
tively few in the first set of regressions. Moreover, the sign of the statistically
significant coefficients is mostly positive. These results indicate that on average
developing countries are not crowding one another out. Instead, when the
coefficient is significant, an increase in the export share is usually matched
by other developing countries. In the second set of regressions, the majority
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of the statistically significant cases have a negative crowding-out coefficient,
indicating that, on average, developing countries are crowding out industrial
countries, but the percentage of the statistically significant cases is not much
higher than that of the first set of regressions. The largest numbers of significant
cases are obtained in the third set of regressions. The signs for the crowding-out
coefficient are mostly positive, indicating that, on average, industrial countries
are not crowding one another out.
Because developing countries’ export shares are not negatively affecting one
another in the majority of cases, and in the second set of regressions approxim-
ately 60 percent of the statistically significant coefficients are negative, the
question is whether industrial countries have been negatively affected by an
increase in developing countries’ share of exports. The fourth and fifth sets of
regressions confirm whether developing countries are crowding out industrial
countries. In the fourth set of fixed-effects regressions, the crowding-out coeffi-
cient will not be statistically significant if developing countries are crowding one
another out. This is because, if there is a crowding-out effect, the market share
for developing countries as a group should be constant, as they are only displac-
ing one another. If it is positive then an increase or a reduction in the growth of
export shares for the group of developing countries is matched by the industrial
country. A negative coefficient means that the group of developing countries
is displacing the individual industrial country or vice versa. In the fifth set of
regressions, the crowding-out coefficient will be negative if developing coun-
tries are crowding one another out. A positive coefficient means that any increase
or reduction of developing countries’ market share as a group is matched by the
individual developing country. Tables 2 and 3 report the regression results.
In the fourth set of regressions (Table 2), in 13 cases the crowding-out co-
efficient is negative and in 11 cases it is statistically significant at the 10-percent
level. Out of 7 cases with positive coefficients, 4 are statistically significant. The
4 countries with positive and statistically significant crowding-out coefficients
are Ireland, Japan, Canada and Australia. The 11 countries with negative coeffi-
cients are the Western European countries. Hence, the results indicate that devel-
oping countries are crowding out Western European countries’ exports for the
period under investigation.
In the fifth set of regressions (Table 3), 2 of the coefficients are negative but
only the coefficient for Turkey is statistically significant. Out of the 17 positive
coefficients, 7 are statistically significant at the 10-percent level. These results
further confirm that developing countries are not crowding one another out.
Instead, the gains come at the expense of the Western European countries’
export shares.
IV. Conclusion
On the one hand, critics of export promotion policies point out the fallacy of
composition, where developing countries specializing in exports of manufactured
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Table 3 Regression results for the fifth set of regressions: fixed-effects regressions of all
developing countries on individual developing country
Country Crowding-out coefficient t-statistics
Bangladesh 1.927 (1.50)
China 0.889* (4.63)
Dominican Republic 1.103 (1.47)
Haiti 1.603 (1.32)
Hong Kong 0.120 (0.71)
India 0.255 (0.91)
Jamaica 11.93* (2.06)
Malaysia 1.365* (4.53)
Mauritius 1.056 (1.03)
Mexico 0.257* (1.80)
Pakistan −0.177 (−0.63)
Singapore 0.057 (0.34)
South Korea 0.108 (0.57)
Sri Lanka 2.416 (0.20)
Taiwan 0.605* (3.74)
Thailand 0.879* (3.80)
the Philippines 1.576* (4.00)
Tunisia 0.307 (0.71)
Turkey −0.572* (−1.78)
Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level.
Table 2 Regression results for the fourth set of regressions:
fixed-effects regressions of all developing countries on individual industrial country
Country Crowding-out coefficient t-statistic
Australia 0.468* (1.93)
Austria −0.125 (−1.04)
Belgium −0.461* (−4.21)
Canada 0.271* (2.25)
Denmark −0.506* (−2.75)
Finland −0.368* (−2.06)
France −0.333* (−4.09)
Germany −0.464* (−6.36)
Iceland 2.049 (0.59)
Ireland 0.449* (1.68)
Italy −0.302* (−3.46)
Japan 0.484* (−4.34)
Netherlands −0.807* (−4.25)
New Zealand 0.987 (1.28)
Norway −0.715* (−4.20)
Spain −0.369* (−2.87)
Sweden −0.324* (−2.20)
Switzerland −0.178* (−1.66)
UK −0.181 (−0.98)
USA 0.022 (0.24)
Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level.
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products compete against each other for industrial countries’ markets. They argue
that export promotion policies take on a zero-sum dimension when adopted by
many developing countries simultaneously. On the other hand, proponents of
export promotion policies contend that shifting comparative advantage would
help ease any capacity constraint because developing countries’ climbing up the
technological ladder opens up their markets for lower technology products and
demand reciprocity will create ever-expanding markets. The estimation results
indicate that for the period investigated developing countries are not crowding one
another out. Instead, the Western European countries’ export shares are crowded
out by the growth of developing countries’ exports in manufactured products.
Although suggestive of crowding out, it should be stressed that the rapid
increase in trade among developing countries might be one of the major reasons
why Western European countries are crowded out by developing countries. In
other words, it is not that Western European countries’ exports have decreased,
but developing countries’ exports, particularly from the East Asian countries,
have increased faster. More importantly, for the period investigated, the evid-
ence suggests that developing countries that specialize in exports of manufac-
tured products are not crowding one another out.
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Appendix
Table A1 Crowding-out effect: developing countries on developing countries (first set of regressions)
BGD CHN DOM HKG HTI IND JAM KOR LKA MEX MUS MYS PAK PHL SGP THA TUN TUR TWN
BGD 1 0.305 −0.319 0.914 −0.183 3.178* −0.040 2.164 −0.006 1.274 −0.438 −0.533 0.034 −1.290 0.694 −3.006* 0.633 1.480* 0.248
(0.17) (−1.05) (0.92) (−1.12) (3.17) (−1.31) (1.22) (−0.44) (0.84) (−1.44) (−0.51) (0.55) −(1.39) (0.52) (−1.94) (0.60) (−1.89) (0.13)
CHN 0.000 1 0.067* 0.507* −0.006 0.041 0.002 −0.043 0.010 −0.029 −0.003 0.288* 0.017 0.215* 0.353* 0.607* −0.019 −0.109* 0.193
(0.45) (2.24) (5.29) (−0.30) (0.87) (0.50) −(0.46) (0.99) (−0.30) (−1.34) (5.02) (0.81) (3.06) (4.25) (7.33) (−0.43) (−2.63) (1.29)
DOM −0.005 0.497* 1 −0.042 −0.014 −0.042 −0.001 −0.130 0.000 0.260 −0.155* 0.059 0.023 0.178 0.175 1.049* 0.089 −0.110 0.193
(−0.19) (2.43) (−0.33) (−0.25) (−0.20) (−1.12) (−0.50) (0.05) (0.99) (−2.54) (0.31) (0.37) (0.87) (0.58) (3.08) (0.57) (−0.70) (0.44)
HKG −0.001 0.219* 0.028 1 −0.027 −0.045 −0.001 −0.042 −0.001 −0.228* 0.002 −0.011 −0.002 −0.012 0.084 0.077 −0.048 0.002 −0.020
(−0.90) (2.11) (1.51) (−1.11) (1.39) −(0.83) (−0.67) (−1.48) (−2.77) (0.48) (−0.16) (−0.67) (−0.25) (1.17) (0.92) (−1.46) (0.06) (−0.15)
HTI 0.008 −0.083 0.004 −0.302 1 0.072 −0.043 0.130 −0.030 1.503* 0.002 0.484 −0.152 0.796 −0.784 0.303 0.156 −0.238 2.157*
(0.26) (−0.11) (0.03) (0.64) (0.13) (−0.99) (0.32) (−0.42) (2.07) (0.09) (1.22) (−0.62) (1.59) (−1.40) (0.40) (0.41) (−0.58) (2.40)
IND 0.007 −0.115 −0.001 −0.141* 0.032 1 −0.001* 0.200 −0.006 0.228 −0.031 0.241* −0.072* 0.156* 0.112 0.297* −0.266* 0.109 0.402*
(0.87) (−1.09) (−0.02) (−2.28) (0.83) (−1.79) (1.25) (−0.35) (1.47) (−1.06) (2.61) (−2.63) (2.23) (0.88) (2.13) (−3.31) (1.11) (1.92)
JAM 0.153 −40.88 −4.765 −3.564 −0.121 −14.83 1 39.492 3.018 −6.813 −0.156 −8.652 1.587 −1.378 −44.04 −1.458 0.917 −9.955 −26.82
(0.54) (−1.21) (−0.54) (−0.12) (−0.16) (−0.90) (1.38) (0.98) (−0.43) (−0.27) (−0.38) (0.30) (−0.11) (−1.15) (−0.15) 0.28 (−0.55) (−0.70)
KOR 0.000 −0.022 −0.040* 0.048 −0.021 0.129* 0.001* 1 0.023* −0.122* 0.005 0.122* 0.018 0.108* 0.008 −0.016 0.003 −0.142* 0.182*
(0.42) (−0.30) (−1.85) (0.93) (−0.36) (2.80) (1.92) (2.71) (−2.88) (0.59) (1.99) (1.33) (3.38) (0.08) (−0.57) (0.27) (−3.00) (1.75)
LKA −0.002 −0.350 0.254 −0.567 −0.021 −0.686 0.014 16.793* 1 −6.566 −0.180 1.168 0.205 4.319 −2.645 −6.406 0.157 −1.227 1.924
(−0.03) (−0.07) (0.21) (−0.17) (−0.10) (−0.29) (0.16) (4.86) (−1.44) (−0.22) (0.30) (0.21) (1.36) (−0.63) (−1.21) (0.10) (−0.53) (0.26)
MEX −0.001 0.092 0.037* 0.062 0.089* 0.028 0.000 −0.091 −0.003 1 0.000 0.069 −0.018 0.064 0.043 0.057 0.057 0.111* 0.228*
(−0.73) (0.96) (1.72) (1.07) (2.32) (0.63) (0.10) (−1.21) (−1.43) 0.00 (1.11) (−1.00) (1.60) (0.52) (0.77) (1.65) (2.27) (1.74)
MUS −0.006 0.079 −0.012 −0.295 −0.008 0.182 0.001 −0.358 0.001 0.475 1 0.225 0.004 0.203 0.306 0.981* −0.099 −0.111 0.173
(−0.13) (0.12) (−0.15) (−0.53) (−0.13) (0.85) (0.09) (−1.03) (0.30) (1.14) (0.72) (0.29) (0.79) (0.83) (2.35) (−0.46) (−0.45) (0.27)
MYS −0.001 0.881* 0.049* 0.168 0.049 0.169* 0.004 0.039 0.015 0.090 0.007 1 −0.028 0.253* 0.823* 0.908* 0.010 −0.231* 0.899*
(−0.45) (5.24) (2.10) (0.87) (1.10) (2.34) (0.91) (0.40) (0.97) (0.49) (1.54) (−0.91) (2.39) (5.83) (6.25) (0.19) (−2.94) (4.27)
PAK −0.004 0.001 −0.033 −0.074 −0.031 −0.086 −0.022* −0.003 0.000 −0.033 0.005 0.021 1 0.052 −0.007 0.020 0.107 −0.068 0.195
(−0.56) 0.00 (−0.71) (−0.75) (−1.13) (−0.69) (−1.82) (−0.02) (0.02) (−0.25) (0.86) (0.27) (0.52) (−0.06) (0.13) (1.59) (−0.97) (1.01)
PHL −0.002 0.542* −0.050 0.167 0.018 0.062 0.011* 0.354* 0.000 0.327 −0.001 0.663* −0.011 1 0.632* 0.768* 0.101 −0.052 1.303*
(−1.05) (2.40) (−1.32) (1.27) (0.87) (0.57) (2.43) (1.78) 0.00 (1.29) (−0.17) (4.14) (−1.29) (3.42) (4.65) (1.18) (−0.39) (3.61)
SGP 0.000 −0.036 0.054* 0.072 −0.107 0.002 0.004 −0.115 −0.002 0.104* 0.006 0.234* −0.018 0.003 1 0.152* −0.009 −0.030 −0.072
(0.49) (−0.38) (2.43) (1.13) (−1.10) (0.04) (1.08) (−1.30) (−0.55) (2.61) (0.94) (4.76) (−1.39) (0.09) (7.50) (−1.08) (−0.65) (−0.82)
THA −0.001 0.303* 0.003 0.060 −0.033 0.119* 0.002 0.161 0.018* −0.107 0.000 0.462* −0.017 0.221* 0.429* 1 −0.063 −0.203* 0.768*
(−0.84) (2.11) (0.12) (0.73) (−1.42) (1.91) (0.62) (1.24) (3.14) (−0.65) (0.04) (6.23) (−0.65) (4.17) (4.36) (−1.03) (−2.95) (4.61)
TUN 0.016 0.090 −0.020 0.341* −0.024 −0.251 0.001 0.049 0.000 0.062 −0.009 0.048 0.127* −0.033 −0.023 −0.175 1 −0.032 −0.447
(1.18) (0.61) (−0.34) (4.12) (−0.79) (−1.62) (1.50) (0.26) (0.08) (0.31) (−0.24) (0.33) (3.06) (−0.31) (−0.13) (−0.87) (−0.28) (−1.41)
TUR 0.039* −0.242* −0.054 −0.036 −0.019 −0.024 0.000 −0.224 −0.009 0.004 −0.023* −0.193 −0.012 −0.035 −0.113 −0.316* 0.048 1 −0.211
(4.86) (−1.98) (−1.20) (−0.49) (−0.42) (−0.23) (0.63) (−1.23) (−1.00) (0.02) (−1.98) (−1.63) (−0.36) (−0.43) (−0.76) (−2.07) (0.47) (−0.80)
TWN 0.001 0.129* −0.005 −0.009 0.027 0.059 0.000 0.341* 0.005 −0.084 0.013 0.218* 0.003 0.130* 0.237* 0.339* −0.043 0.018 1
(0.77) (2.02) (−0.20) (−0.21) (0.96) (1.17) (0.96) (3.82) (0.59) (−0.90) (0.74) (3.32) (0.26) (3.21) (2.78) (4.70) (−1.01) (0.31)
Notes: The rows are for country i and the columns are for country j. For example, the coefficient in the first row and the second column in Table A1 reports the effect of Chinese exports on Bangladesh’ top ten exports.
* denotes significance at the 10% level. t-statistics are given in parentheses. See http://worldatlas.com/aatlas/ctycodes.htm for a list of country names corresponding to the three-letter country codes.
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Table A2 Crowding-out effect: developing countries on industrial countries (second set of regressions)
AUS AUT BEL CAN CHE DEU DNK ESP FIN FRA GBR IRL ISL ITA JPN NLD NOR NZL SWE USA
BGD 0.091 5.827* 0.244 0.988 −2.948 1.261 1.559 0.616 −0.217 0.403 4.913* −0.977 0.190 5.119* −1.585 1.041 0.160 −0.416 −0.234 −1.804
(0.07) (2.65) (0.24) (0.53) (−1.31) (0.44) (0.89) (0.40) (−0.23) (0.15) (1.88) (−0.98) (0.84) (2.04) (−0.72) (0.64) (0.34) (−0.98) (−0.15) (−0.65)
CHN 0.110* −0.059 −0.153* 0.273* 0.114 −0.652* −0.178* −0.275* −0.001 −0.289* −0.378* −0.059 0.013* −0.420 0.440* −0.215* −0.029 0.071* −0.174* 0.456*
(1.99) (−0.47) (−2.91) (2.63) (0.94) (−4.91) (−1.86) (−3.01) (−0.02) (−1.99) (−2.81) (−0.98) (2.77) (−3.00) (4.04) (−2.80) (−1.13) (3.92) (−2.14) (2.92)
DOM −0.379 0.243 −0.104 0.833* 0.455 −0.599 0.078 0.304 0.100 0.164 −0.016 −0.147 −0.012 −0.481 0.800* 0.066 −0.074 0.079 −0.194 1.392*
(−1.52) (0.49) (−0.56) (2.32) (1.06) (−1.16) (0.25) (0.90) (0.54) (0.33) (−0.03) (−0.74) (−0.42) (−0.82) (2.11) (0.23) (−0.85) (1.01) (−0.65) (2.82)
HKG −0.027 −0.005 −0.024 0.000 0.043 −0.175 0.000 0.097 −0.022 −0.094 0.034 −0.010 −0.008 −0.046 0.106 −0.162* −0.022 −0.016 −0.179* 0.072
(−0.48) (−0.05) (−0.25) 0.00 (0.38) (−1.27) 0.00 (1.52) (−0.47) (−0.72) (0.29) (−0.14) (−1.08) (−0.40) (0.91) (−2.53) (−0.70) (−0.92) (−2.39) (0.51)
HTI 0.015 −0.608 −0.617 −0.616 −1.052 0.688 −0.576 −1.115 −0.221 −0.931 −0.449 −0.719* 0.034 −0.794 1.305 −0.577 0.389 0.270* 0.051 0.000
(0.03) (−0.70) (−0.67) (−0.96) (−0.99) (0.58) (−0.80) (−1.29) (−0.54) (−0.94) (−0.45) (−1.70) (1.28) (−0.65) (1.66) (−0.96) (1.50) (1.87) (0.08) 0.00
IND 0.135 −0.015 −0.723* 0.573* −0.006 −0.513* −0.463* −0.020 −0.022 −0.518* −0.116 −0.160 0.024 −0.245 0.245 −0.361* 0.004 0.164* −0.151 0.223
(0.88) (−0.06) (−3.21) (2.89) (−0.02) (−1.75) (−2.72) (−0.08) (−0.21) (−1.87) (−0.41) (−1.32) (1.53) (−0.78) (1.05) (−2.45) (0.06) (4.69) (−0.91) (0.90)
JAM 2.323 44.369 66.885 −4.595 11.753 40.081 14.843 −7.563 1.380 54.196 3.378 7.097 −0.082 24.387 −5.718 28.690 2.664 −3.682 −3.211 −57.52
(0.09) (1.10) (1.29) (−0.07) (0.32) (0.59) (0.48) (−0.13) (0.07) (0.63) (0.08) (0.23) (−0.02) (0.45) (−0.10) (0.70) (0.13) (−0.35) (−0.09) (−0.69)
KOR −0.113 −0.421* 0.022 0.398* −0.253* −0.452* 0.095 −0.420* −0.094* −0.467* −0.057 0.145* 0.001 0.062 0.011 −0.280* −0.114* −0.001 −0.242* −0.415*
(−1.43) (−3.96) (0.14) (2.40) (−2.45) (−2.40) (1.05) (−2.73) (−1.71) (−1.90) (−0.46) (1.77) (0.10) (0.40) (0.06) (−2.61) (−1.99) (−0.05) (−2.56) (−1.93)
LKA 2.469 −9.046 1.518 −3.811 1.429 −0.817 −1.596 −7.262 1.130 2.161 −3.656 0.921 −0.343 −7.719 5.289 −2.116 −0.520 0.132 0.380 −3.815
(0.76) (−1.54) (0.56) (−0.73) (0.24) (−0.11) (−0.32) (−1.53) (0.42) (0.27) (−0.46) (0.29) (−0.61) (−1.04) (0.86) (−0.52) (0.41) (0.13) (0.09) (0.46)
MEX 0.070 0.350* −0.103 0.168 −0.110 −0.142 0.015 −0.008 0.025 −0.119 −0.013 −0.064 0.005 −0.134 −0.006 −0.084 0.066* 0.027 0.189* −0.001
(1.11) (3.01) (−0.88) (1.41) (−0.84) (−0.85) (0.16) (−0.08) (0.42) (−0.70) (−0.09) (−0.86) (1.43) (−0.89) (−0.05) (−0.92) (1.70) (1.35) (2.17) (−0.01)
MUS −0.072 0.671 0.908* −0.182 0.305 −0.154 −0.317 −0.041 −0.238 −0.285 0.498 0.094 0.003 0.077 −0.594 0.209 −0.005 −0.021 −0.568 −0.249
(−0.24) (1.20) (1.74) (−0.38) (0.57) (−0.21) (−0.71) (−0.13) (−1.00) (−0.39) (0.80) (0.22) (0.08) (0.13) (−1.12) (0.60) (−0.03) (−0.21) (−1.44) (−0.35)
MYS 0.156* −0.447* −0.867* 0.479* −0.285 −1.267* −0.562* −0.650* 0.130 −1.079* −0.649* −0.427* 0.020* −0.664* 0.442* −0.543* −0.069 0.163* −0.253* 0.535*
(1.99) (−2.25) (−5.21) (2.55) (−1.21) (−5.68) (−3.50) (−4.05) (1.30) (−5.26) (−3.26) (−4.25) (2.81) (−2.84) (2.57) (−4.41) (−1.07) (5.94) (−1.73) (−2.06)
PAK −0.111 0.125 −0.088 −0.283* −0.195 −0.281 −0.016 −0.019 0.005 −0.178 −0.441* −0.060 0.005 0.052 0.027 −0.098 0.065* −0.033 −0.049 0.335
(−1.14) (0.67) (−1.11) (−1.88) (−1.08) (−1.28) (−0.11) (−0.14) (0.07) (−0.83) (−2.16) (−0.73) (0.65) (0.22) (0.17) (−0.75) (1.77) (−1.03) (−0.39) (1.63)
PHL 0.249 −0.721* −0.286 0.636* −0.367 −1.178* −0.485* −0.298 −0.236 −0.717 −0.306 −0.025 0.006 −0.856* 0.415 −0.638* 0.027 0.177* 0.027 0.692
(1.29) (−2.27) (−0.91) (2.07) (−1.13) (−2.60) (−1.79) (−1.47) (−1.66) (−1.44) (−0.69) (−0.13) (0.40) (−2.48) (1.25) (−2.82) (0.29) (−3.37) (0.11) (1.50)
SGP 0.040 0.106 −0.429* −0.049 0.109 −0.251 −0.107 0.079 0.059 −0.513* −0.008 −0.039 0.005 −0.027 0.516* −0.201* −0.163 0.114* 0.264* −0.177
(0.56) (0.98) (−3.61) (−0.32) (1.13) (−1.37) (−1.32) (0.68) (1.07) (−2.51) (−0.07) (−0.48) (0.87) (−0.18) (3.57) (−1.90) (−1.55) (5.28) (2.85) (−0.81)
THA 0.229* −0.483* −0.484* 0.416* 0.135 −1.097* −0.302* −0.434* −0.057 −0.847* −0.358* −0.227* 0.012* −0.556* 0.702* −0.428* −0.060 0.110* −0.282* 0.503*
(2.63) (−3.05) (−2.89) (2.58) (0.76) (−5.55) (−2.37) (−3.07) (−0.68) (−4.01) (−1.83) (−2.09) (2.24) (−2.70) (3.77) (−3.98) (−1.08) (4.36) (−2.35) (2.16)
TUN −0.103 0.774* −0.064 0.107 0.517 0.308 0.188 −0.569* 0.030 0.288 −0.409 0.063 0.020 0.606 −0.060 0.140 0.060 −0.006 0.065 −0.145
(−0.49) (2.51) (−0.45) (0.40) (1.56) (0.80) (0.78) (−2.06) (0.21) (0.76) (−1.03) (0.44) (0.87) (1.41) (−0.18) (0.67) (0.86) (−0.09) (0.27) (−0.39)
TUR −0.079 0.408 0.555* −0.253 −0.563* 0.624* 0.260 0.657* 0.028 1.083* 0.269 0.205 −0.007 0.977* −0.482* 0.391* 0.094 −0.067 0.186 −0.533*
(−0.60) (1.69) (2.11) (−1.03) (−2.14) (1.92) (1.45) (3.13) (0.23) (3.44) (0.99) (1.28) (−0.97) (3.15) (−1.74) (2.48) (1.20) (−1.57) (1.00) (−1.75)
TWN 0.182* −0.203 −0.558* 0.185 −0.214 −0.952* −0.301* −0.470* −0.050 −0.941* −0.683* −0.228* 0.005 −0.549* 0.670* −0.431* −0.085* 0.102* −0.120 0.501*
(1.89) (−1.32) (−4.93) (1.35) (−1.34) (−5.76) (−2.64) (−3.51) (−0.73) (−6.22) (−3.92) (−2.35) (0.47) (−2.99) (5.08) (−4.77) (−1.96) (5.17) (−1.15) (2.87)
Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level. t-statistics are given in parentheses. See http://worldatlas.com/aatlas/ctycodes.htm for a list of country names corresponding to the three-letter country codes.
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Table A3 Crowding-out effect: industrial countries on industrial countries (third set of regressions)
AUS AUT BEL CAN CHE DEU DNK ESP FIN FRA GBR IRL ISL ITA JPN NLD NOR NZL SWE USA
AUS 1 −0.222 −0.302 0.356* −0.278 −0.588* −0.229 −0.226 0.026 −0.654* 0.003 0.105 0.007 −0.252 −0.102 −0.248* −0.105 0.022 0.089 0.025
(−1.15) (−1.38) (1.86) (−1.30) (−2.08) (−1.33) (−1.30) (0.18) (−2.50) (0.01) (0.91) (0.51) (−0.94) (−0.44) (−1.94) (−0.65) (0.58) (0.48) (0.10)
AUT −0.035 1 0.257* −0.104 0.062 0.394* 0.195* 0.187* 0.081 0.391* 0.065 −0.011 −0.001 0.290* −0.183* 0.051 0.123 −0.017 0.172* −0.059
(−0.72) 2.61 (−1.01) (0.53) (2.72) (2.59) (2.19) (1.18) (3.09) (0.55) (−0.16) (−0.26) (2.13) (−1.75) (0.69) (1.64) (−1.04) (1.95) (−0.44)
BEL −0.125* 0.246* 1 −0.152 0.172 0.620* 0.362* 0.389* 0.103 0.719* 0.420* 0.020 −0.011 0.301* −0.577* 0.286* 0.252* −0.099* 0.119 −0.447*
(−2.19) (2.44) (−1.48) (1.51) (4.57) (4.50) (4.08) (1.35) (6.72) (3.57) (0.33) (−1.58) (2.16) (−5.64) (4.71) (3.19) (−6.34) (1.30) (−3.69)
CAN 0.028 −0.062 −0.001 1 −0.067 −0.049 −0.052 −0.162* 0.024 −0.009 −0.174* 0.058 0.003 −0.105 0.089 −0.029 0.006 0.027 0.003 −0.068
(0.61) (−0.86) (−0.01) (−1.03) (−0.38) (−0.93) (−1.88) (0.65) (−0.06) (−2.28) (1.20) (0.84) (−1.10) (0.81) (−0.41) (0.08) (1.64) (0.05) (−0.45)
CHE −0.127* 0.145 0.175* 0.068 1 0.318* 0.159* −0.048 −0.066 0.158 0.167 0.068 −0.012 0.039 −0.145 0.055 0.104 0.007 −0.121 −0.319*
(−2.17) (1.40) (1.97) (0.79) (2.13) (1.81) (−0.76) (−1.10) (1.32) (1.55) (1.12) (−1.55) (0.35) (−1.46) (0.82) (1.64) (0.43) (−1.20) (−2.64)
DEU −0.120* 0.234* 0.385* −0.138* 0.116 1 0.258* 0.313* −0.001 0.672* 0.275* 0.135* −0.004* 0.446* −0.479* 0.329* 0.258* −0.058* 0.211 −0.440*
(−2.40) (3.04) (7.82) (−1.92) (1.45) (5.12) (6.72) (−0.01) (9.74) (2.89) (2.46) (−1.84) (4.83) (−8.16) (7.09) (5.10) (−5.66) (3.26) (−4.69)
DNK −0.062 0.164 0.574* −0.458* 0.405* 0.930* 1 0.297* −0.006 0.786* 0.425* 0.366* −0.011* 0.715* −0.351* 0.230* 0.098* −0.100* 0.328 −0.382*
(−0.82) (0.99) (4.89) (−3.45) (2.39) (5.46) (2.96) (−0.09) (5.00) (2.81) (4.29) (−3.19) (4.02) (−2.68) (2.23) (2.26) (−4.69) (3.26) (−2.14)
ESP −0.113 0.066 0.107 −0.400* 0.082 0.140 −0.039 1 0.066 0.619* 0.175* 0.062 −0.015* 0.476* −0.330* 0.053 0.220* −0.014 0.226 −0.236
(−2.17) (0.84) (0.94) (−3.82) (1.12) (1.03) (−0.61) (1.60) (3.93) (2.14) (1.11) (−2.04) (5.13) (−2.72) (0.73) (2.61) (−0.67) (3.25) (−1.68)
FIN −0.029 0.169 −0.020 0.038 −0.023 0.494* 0.008 0.324* 1 0.168 0.169 0.035 0.015* 0.639* −0.229 0.137 0.390* −0.004 0.519 −0.258
(−0.37) (0.98) (−0.12) (0.22) (−0.14) (2.11) (0.06) (2.43) (0.79) (0.89) (0.39) (3.23) (3.11) (−1.38) (1.20) (3.51) (−0.14) (4.07) (−1.24)
FRA −0.090* 0.145* 0.282* −0.010 0.078 0.502* 0.115* 0.236* 0.057* 1 0.108* 0.090* −0.004 0.057 −0.329* 0.243* 0.209* −0.051* 0.077 −0.352*
(−2.52) (2.78) (4.66) (−0.13) (1.59) (6.67) (2.93) (3.94) (2.06) (1.87) (2.36) (1.47) (0.79) (−4.28) (5.12) (4.18) (−4.43) (1.60) (−3.63)
GBR −0.242* −0.097 −0.065 −0.223 −0.007 −0.018 0.082 0.168 0.001 0.249 1 0.154* −0.006 0.489* −0.789* −0.220* −0.218* −0.045* 0.025 −0.305
(−3.74) (−0.95) (−0.48) (−1.53) (−0.07) (−0.10) (1.01) (1.45) (0.03) (1.10) (2.05) (−1.15) (3.85) (−5.71) (−2.22) (−2.11) (−1.81) (0.26) (−1.47)
IRL −0.354* −0.191 0.137 0.236 −0.028 0.288 0.050 0.202 0.105 0.797* 0.356* 1 −0.024 0.606* −0.506* −0.057 −0.004 −0.041 0.310* −1.019*
(−3.65) (−1.25) (0.68) (1.06) (−0.20) (1.09) (0.40) (1.10) (1.34) (2.53) (2.19) (−1.61) (3.13) (−2.17) (−0.39) (−0.02) (−1.09) (2.24) (−3.42)
ISL 2.428 −0.587 −6.001* 4.243 −0.588 −4.772 −0.718 −2.630 1.660 −5.592 −3.242 −2.528* 1 −2.725 5.234* −0.234 3.663* 1.760* −1.900 2.543
(1.45) (−0.27) (−2.34) (1.34) (−0.31) (−1.31) (−0.47) (−1.08) (1.56) (−1.39) (−1.45) (−1.85) (−0.92) (1.83) (−0.10) (1.70) (3.57) (−0.97) (−0.68)
ITA 0.028 0.163* 0.323* −0.156 −0.016 0.612* 0.362* 0.480* 0.091* 0.523* 0.380* 0.161* −0.005 1 −0.434* 0.265* 0.073* −0.058* 0.200* −0.360*
(0.54) (1.87) (4.19) (−2.01) (−0.16) (6.69) (5.15) (7.64) (2.33) (5.78) (4.25) (3.24) (−1.47) (−6.61) (5.54) (3.02) (−4.77) (3.39) (−4.01)
JPN 0.025 −0.155 −0.404* 0.078 −0.007 −0.812* −0.229* −0.280* −0.054 −0.683* −0.645* −0.160* 0.006* −0.566* 1 −0.296 −0.296* 0.058* −0.350* 0.120
(0.46) (−1.54) (−5.22) (0.80) (−0.07) (−7.30) (−3.23) (−4.05) (−0.84) (−6.47) (−6.48) (−2.46) (2.10) (−4.92) (−4.42) (−4.54) (3.79) (−4.63) (0.86)
NLD −0.165* 0.241 0.650* −0.163 0.442* 1.251* 0.407* 0.237* 0.028 1.261* 0.494* 0.178* 0.007 0.476* −0.691* 1 0.173 −0.102* 0.265* −1.021*
(−2.11) (1.45) (4.56) (−1.09) (2.37) (6.16) (2.88) (2.15) (0.30) (8.08) (2.45) (1.78) (0.70) (2.65) (−3.97) (1.59) (−4.13) (1.87) (−4.74)
NOR 0.138* 0.299* 0.123 0.093 0.335* 0.890* −0.078 0.288* 0.222* 0.788* −0.228* 0.026 0.009 0.029 −0.291* 0.424* 1 0.018 0.098 −0.134
(1.95) (2.68) (0.84) (0.54) (3.45) (5.09) (−0.93) (2.35) (4.02) (3.67) (−1.95) (0.33) (1.65) (0.18) (−1.85) (4.13) (0.62) (0.94) (−0.64)
NZL 0.383 0.398 −3.250* 1.292* 0.202 −0.968 −1.112* −0.142 0.093 −3.032* −1.147* −0.479* 0.058 −1.116* 3.248* −0.702 −0.010 1 0.470 1.374*
(1.20) (0.88) (−6.57) (1.95) (0.52) (−1.24) (−3.59) (−0.22) (0.41) (−3.60) (−2.49) (−1.74) (1.09) (−1.84) (6.47) (−1.63) (−0.02) (1.13) (1.82)
SWE −0.036 0.268* 0.330* −0.058 −0.013 0.719* 0.257* 0.314* 0.297* 0.426* 0.440* 0.224* −0.003 0.805* −0.516* 0.219* 0.146 −0.050* 1 −0.218
(−0.59) (1.95) (2.68) (−0.45) (−0.09) (4.21) (2.74) (3.01) (3.68) (2.65) (3.16) (2.90) (−0.72) (5.36) (−4.33) (2.45) (1.56) (−2.49) (−1.33)
USA 0.074* −0.054 −0.031 −0.003 −0.131* −0.359* −0.051 −0.141* −0.089* −0.437* −0.085 −0.130* 0.001 −0.144* 0.021 −0.131* −0.062 0.021 −0.066 1
(2.07) (−0.99) (−0.46) (−0.03) (−2.76) (−4.26) (−1.22) (−2.45) (−3.41) (−4.39) (−1.48) (−3.50) (0.50) (−2.05) (0.26) (−2.50) (−1.16) (1.64) (−1.36)
Notes: * denotes significance at the 10% level. t-statistics are given in parentheses. See http://worldatlas.com/aatlas/ctycodes.htm for a list of country names corresponding to the three-letter country codes.
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